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LEGAL PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE-APPLICATION OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL FROM AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING TO A CIVIL

AcTION-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, given the fast
and informal nature of unemployment compensation proceedings,
as well as the economic risk in those actions, a factual finding
made during an unemployment compensation hearing should not be
afforded preclusive effect in a subsequent civil action brought by
the same employee.
Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1998).
After receiving unemployment compensation from her former
employer, K-Mart Corporation ("K-Mart"), Patricia Rue sued K-Mart
for defamation in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.' Rue,
an employee at the K-Mart distribution center in Bucks County,
Pennsylvania, had been fired on January 10, 1989.2 K-Mart
management informed Rue that she was terminated because
security personnel had observed her eating a bag of potato chips
that she had allegedly stolen from inventory.3 After Rue's
termination, the remaining employees at the K-Mart distribution
center began to gossip about the possible circumstances
surrounding Rue's dismissal. This gossip resulted in a decrease in
productivity. 4 To halt the decrease in productivity, the management
1. Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 713 A-2d 82, 83-84 (Pa. 1998). Defamation is defined as "an
intentional false communication, either published or publicly spoken, that injures another's
reputation or good name." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1990).
"Holding up of a person to ridicule, scorn or contempt in a respectable and considerable
part of the community; may be criminal as well as civil." Id.
2. Rue, 713 A.2d at 83. Patricia Rue had worked for Defendant K-Mart for over 12 years
as a warehouse employee. Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 67 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 107 (Pa. C. 1995). The
warehouse in which Patricia worked was a distribution center for all K-Mart products. Rue,
67 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 107.
3. Rue, 713 A.2d at 83. Items stored at the K-Mart distribution warehouse include
edible food items. Rue, 67 BucksCo. LRep. at 107. The security personnel who allegedly
observed Rue eating the potato chips testified as to their observations at the Unemployment
Compensation hearing, as did witnesses for the defendant (Rue). Brief for Appellee at 11,
Rue v K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82 (1998) (No. 90-00248-19-2). Allegedly K-Mart had been
having problems during that time with employees breaking into boxes that were stored at
the warehouse distribution center that contained edible food items and eating said food
items while at work. Rue, 67 Bucks Co. L Rep. at 107. The security guards had reported to
K-Mart that they had observed Rue eating a bag of potato chips at work. Id. K-Mart then
informed Rue that she had been observed stealing a bag of potato chips out of inventory and
was terminated. Id.
4. Rue, 713 A.2d at 83.
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of the K-Mart distribution center conducted a meeting with the
employees during which they informed the employees that Rue had
5
been dismissed for misappropriation of company property.
After Rue was fired from her job, the local job center granted
her application for unemployment compensation. 6 In response,
7
K-Mart appealed the decision to grant Rue unemployment benefits.
K-Mart argued that Rue was fired for an act that constituted willful
misconduct 8 and, therefore, was not entitled to benefits pursuant to
Pennsylvania law.' During the hearing, K-Mart presented evidence
to the referee to support its contention that Rue was terminated
because she stole and ate a bag of potato chips from K-Mart
inventory. 10 After the hearing, the referee affirmed the
compensation award granted by the job center and found that, as a
matter of fact, Rue did not steal the bag of potato chips." K-Mart
did not appeal this decision. 2
Thereafter, Rue filed a civil defamation action in the Bucks
County Court of Common Pleas, in which she alleged that, by
telling her former co-workers the reason for her termination,
K-Mart had defamed her.' 3 Before trial, the trial court granted Rue's
motion in limine to preclude K-Mart from introducing any evidence
or testimony at trial to substantiate the allegation that Rue had
stolen a bag of potato chips from the corporation. 4 In granting the
5. Id. The Plaintiff's co-workers were told that Rue had been fired for concealing and
eating a bag of potato chips and were urged to return to their work. Rue v. K-Mart Corp.,
691 A.2d 498, 499 (Pa. Super. 1997).
6. Rue, 713 A-2d at 84.
7. Id. Rue was initially awarded benefits and K-Mart appealed the initial award in an
Unemployment Compensation Hearing. Rue, 67 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 107.
8. Willful misconduct involves: " (1) wanton and willful disregard of employer's
interest, (2) deliberate violation of rules, (3) disregard of standards of behavior which an
employer can rightfully expect from his employee, or (4) negligence which manifests
culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for
employer's interests or the employee's duties and obligations." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1600
(6th ed. 1990) citing Wilson v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 325 A.2d 500,
501 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974).
9. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law states that, "An
employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week. . . in which his employment is
due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected
with his work. . . " 43 PA CONS. STAT. § 802(e) 1991.
10. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84.
11. Id. In the referee's written Finding of Fact, stated that Rue "did not misappropriate
company property and did not eat a bag of the employer's potato chips on January 10, 1989."
Rue, 67 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 107.
12. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84.
13. Id. Rue, 691 A.2d at 500.
14. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. A motion in limine is "[a] pretrial motion requesting court to
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motion in limine, the court applied the doctrine of collateral
estoppel to prevent K-Mart from discussing or questioning the
determination made by the referee at the unemployment
compensation hearing that Rue had not stolen a bag of potato
chips. 15 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found K-Mart liable
for defamation.' 6 The jury awarded Rue $90,000 in compensatory
damages and $1.4 million in punitive damages. 17 K-Mart filed
motions for post-trial relief, which the court of common pleas
8
denied.'
K-Mart appealed the judgment to the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which affirmed the trial court's order.19 Thereafter, K-Mart
petitioned for and was granted reargument before the superior
court en banc. 20 The superior court, en banc, reversed the and
prohibit opposing counsel from referring to or offering evidence on matters so highly
prejudicial to moving party that curative instructions cannot prevent predispositional effect
on jury . . . purpose of such motion is to avoid injection into trial of matters which are
irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial and granting of motion is not a ruling on evidence
and, where properly drawn, granting of motion cannot be error." BLACK's LAw DicTIONARY
1013-1014 (6th ed. 1990).
15. Rue, 713 A2d at 84. Collateral estoppel doctrine occurs when "prior judgement
between same parties on different cause of action is an estoppel as to those matters in issue
or points controverted, on determination of which finding or verdict was rendered . . .
When an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot
be again litigated between the same parties in future litigation." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 261
(6th ed. 1990).
16. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. The jury trial was held in the Court of Common Pleas of
Bucks County, Pennsylvania on December 9 and December 12 of 1994. Rue, 67 Bucks Co. L.
Rep. at 108.
17. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. Compensatory damages, also known as actual damages, is a
monetary compensation that is awarded to a complainant to compensate for a proven injury
or loss. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed. 1990). Punitive damages are awarded in addition
to compensatory damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or deceit;
such damages are intended to punish or deter such behavior. Id.
18. Rue, 713 A-2d at 84. In denying K-Mart's Motion or Post-Trial Relief, the trial court
determined that in order to grant K-Mart a new trial they had to "consider the entire record
to determine whether the verdict was arbitrary or capricious or whether it was against the
weight of the evidence, or whether there was clearly error of law or palpable abuse of
discretion in the rulings.. . ." Rue, 67 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 108 (quoting Gonzales v. United
States Steel Corp., 374 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Pa. Super. 1977), aff'd, 398 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1979)).
The trial court then went on to say that "[a] new trial is appropriate only when "the jury's
verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and 'to make the
award of a new trial imperative, so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.'"
Id. (quoting Insurance Co. of Pa. v Miller, 627 A.2d 797, 798 (Pa. Super. 1993), quoting
Thompson v City of Philadelphia, 493 A.2d 669, 672 (Pa. 1985)).
19. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. A panel of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
Order of the trial court on June 12, 1996, but the opinion was withdrawn upon grant of
reargument on August 22, 1996. Rue, 691 A.2d at 500. The standard of review used was
abuse of discretion. Brief for Appellant at 4, Rue v K-Mart Corp., 713 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1998).
20. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. En banc "[r]efers to a session where the entire membership of
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remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel could not be properly used in connection with
the factual finding of a referee during an unemployment
compensation hearing. 21 Judge Ford Elliot filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which she disagreed
with the majority's analysis of the past application of collateral
estoppel in a line of workers' compensation cases but nonetheless
22
agreed with the majority's conclusion in this case.
Rue appealed the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court en
banc to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which granted
allocatur.23 On appeal, the supreme court determined whether the
factual findings of a referee in an unemployment compensation
hearing doctrine could be applied to a subsequent civil action or
did the doctrine of collateral estoppel preclude that from
24
happening.
The supreme court began its discussion of the case by
establishing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as
"issue preclusion," can be applied only after four requirements have
been met.25 The four requirements are as follows: (1) the issue
presented in the later (civil) action must be identical to the issue
decided in the previous action; (2) a final judgment on the merits
must have been determined in the first action; (3) the party in the
the court will participate. ..

." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).

21. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. The Superior Court, in making its determination, looked at the
public policy underlying the Unemployment Compensation Law. Id. at 85. It emphasized that
the objective of the Unemployment Compensation system is to get money to the unemployed
person requesting it at the earliest point that is administratively possible. Rue, 691 A.2d at
502. For that reason, the public policy underlying the Unemployment Compensation Law
requires "fast and informal" decision making by the Referee, which does not provide the "full
and fair" litigation that is used in civil judicial proceedings, and which is needed for the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. at 506-08. Consequently, the Superior
Court reversed the decision of the trial court, because the trial court had granted use of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude the factual determination of the unemployment
compensation referee, which was integral in making a determination of liability. Id. at 509.
Remand means to send a case back to the court from which it came for further action (in
this case for an entirely new trial). BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1293 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84. In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Ford Elliott
stated that it was her belief that the same policy considerations should be examined and
used regardless of whether the case deals with an Unemployment Compensation issue or a
Workers' Compensation issue. Rue, 691 A.2d at 509-11 (Ford Elliott, J., concurring and
dissenting).
23. Rue, 713 A.2d at 83. Allocatur is Latin for "[iut is allowed," meaning the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania allowed the case to be heard. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed.
1990).
24. Rue, 713 A.2d at 83.
25. Id.
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later action must be the same party (or be in privity with that
party) against whom the issue had been decided in the earlier
action; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is being
asserted must have had a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the first action.2 6 According to the court, the second and
third requirements were unquestionably satisfied in Rue's case
because the referee's decision was final once K-Mart failed to
appeal it (satisfying the second requirement), and K-Mart was a
party to both actions (satisfying the third requirement).27 With
prongs two and three satisfied, the court focused its discussion on
prong one-whether the issues were identical-and prong
four-whether K-Mart had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
action. 2s
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that prong one was
satisfied because the issue addressed in Rue's motion in limine in
the defamation action (i.e., whether Rue misappropriated and ate a
bag of potato chips belonging to K-Mart) was the same issue
decided by the referee in the initial action. 29 The supreme court
looked to the superior court's reliance on Odgers v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review and determined that-the lower
court had erred in its analysis. 30 The supreme court conceded that
26. Id. at 84 (citing to Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872 (Pa. 1996); Safeguard Mutual
Insurance co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1975)). To be in privity there must exist a
relationship between two contracting parties, with each having a legally recognized interest
in the subject matter. BLACK'S LAw DICnoNARY 502 (6th ed. 1990).
27. Rue, 713 A.2d at 84.
28. Id
29. Id. However, the superior court determined that this was not enough to satisfy the
requirements of collateral estoppel due to the fact that the court, in analyzing the issue, must
look at public policy issues. Id.
30. Rue, 713 A.2d 82 at 85 (citing Odgers v Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 525 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1987)). Odgers involved a work stoppage by teachers that was
deemed by the Commonwealth Court to be an illegal "strike" in accordance with Section
1002 of the Public Employee Relations Act, Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, as
amended, 43 P.S. §1002. Odgers, 525 A.2d at 359. In that case the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that the determination of an illegal strike did not have a preclusive effect,
when the teachers later appealed the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review's denial
of unemployment benefits, which was made in accordance with Section 402(d) of the
Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. §802(d). Rue, 713 A.2d at 85 (citing Odgers, 525
A.2d at 387-89). Section 802(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law provides that, "an
employee shall be ineligible for compensation for any week. . . in which his unemployment
is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out)
"
at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed ...
Rue, 713 A.2d at 85 (quoting 43 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. 802(d) (1991)). In Odgers the court
stated, "Public Employee Relations Act (PERA) and the Pennsylvania Unemployment
Compensation Law were enacted to promote decidedly different public policies of this
Commonwealth... it logically follows that the determination of what constitutes a strike for
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the superior court had been correct in observing that the issue of
whether Rue had committed an act of willful misconduct was
distinct from the conclusion of whether K-Mart had made
defamatory statements for purposes of the Pennsylvania
Unemployment
Compensation Law. 31 The supreme
court
determined that such legal conclusions were not at issue in the
present case. 32 According to the court, the issue in this case was
not one of law and fact, but one of pure fact. 3 The court
concluded that the public policy differences that may exist between
the civil action for defamation and the Pennsylvania Unemployment
Compensation Law were immaterial. 4
Next, the court looked at the fourth and final prong of the test
for collateral estoppel; that is, whether K-Mart, the party against
whom collateral estoppel was asserted, had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue of whether Rue had stolen the
potato chips during the first action (the unemployment
compensation hearing). 35 The court concluded that, although the
minimum requirements of procedural due process are satisfied by
proceedings before a referee, parties are not able to litigate issues
before a referee in the same fashion that may do so in a court of
record.3 6 For example, in a referee's hearing, evidentiary rules do
37
not apply and there is no prehearing discovery procedure.
In addition, the supreme court noted two important factors that
differentiate court proceedings from unemployment compensation
purposes of PERA is not coextensive with the determination whether a work stoppage is a
strike or a lock-out under the terms of the Unemployment Compensation Law ... " Rue, 713
A.2d at 85 (quoting Odgers, 525 A.2d at 363-64).
31. Rue, 713 A.2d at 85.
32. Id. The Supreme Court cites to Bortz v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 683
A.2d 259 (Pa. 1996), which held that a disability determination in a workers' compensation
proceeding is distinct from a determination of willful misconduct in an unemployment
compensation proceeding. Rue, 713 A.2d at 85 (citing Bortz, 683 A.2d at 262).
33. Rue, 713 A.2d at 85. The Court re-emphasizes the difference between the case at
bar, which involves only a factual issue, and the cases discussed previously, Odgers and
Bortz, both of which involved to some extent, a question of law. Rue, 713 A-2d at 85.
34. Rue, 713 A.2d at 85. For emphasis, the court then says that regardless of public
policy, a fact is a fact. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 86. A court of record is a court that is required to keep a record of its
proceedings, and that may fine or imprisonment. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 353 (6th ed. 1990).
37. Rue, 713 A.2d at 86. Section 505 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. §
825 states, "The conduct of hearings and appeals. . . shall be in accordance with rules of
procedure prescribed by the board whether or not such rules conform to common law or
statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure. ..
Id. at 86 (quoting 43
PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 825 (1991)).
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proceedings.3 The first difference is that cases dealing with
unemployment compensation are adjudicated quickly and are
designed to allow the unemployed person, who has no income, to
receive money as rapidly as possible. 39 The second difference is
that the amount of money being discussed in unemployment
compensation hearings is often insignificant to the employer,
because the most the employer would usually pay would be a
minimal increase in the amount it devotes to the Pennsylvania
Unemployment Compensation Fund.4° Because there is little chance
that an employer will be forced to pay a large sum of money at an
unemployment compensation hearing, the employer has virtually no
incentive to litigate the case to its utmost ability.41 The Rue Court
noted that this disincentive is not present in civil actions, as
demonstrated by this case, in which K-Mart was subject to
considerably larger liability than that at stake at the hearing
conducted by a referee. 42
In light of these two factors, the court concluded that the
prohibitive effects of a referee's factual findings are annulled by the
procedural and economic disparities between unemployment
compensation hearings and civil actions. 43 The court looked to
Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which
provides that collateral estoppel should not apply when there is a
difference either in the quality or extensiveness of the different
procedures or in the amount in controversy.44 The court found that
38. Id.
39. Id. The court cites to CaliforniaDepartment of Human Resources v Java, 402 U.S.
121, 136 (1971) and refers to McNeil v Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 511
A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. 1986)and Swineford v Snyder County, 15 F3d 1258, 1268-69 (3d Cir. 1994)
to emphasize that proceedings conducted by a Referee are brief and informal by design. Rue,
713 A.2d at 86. The court also cites statistics gathered by the Department of Labor and
Industry to illustrate how quickly cases are adjudicated in front of Referees. Id. From July 1,
1996 to June 30, 1997, a one year period, the fifty referees employed by the Commonwealth
to hear unemployment compensation cases issued 51,199 decisions, which is more than 1,000
decisions per referee. Id.
40. Rue, 713 A.2d at 86.
41. Id. In some instances, the employer may not even attend the hearing or retain
counsel to represent them at the hearing. Id.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id.
44. Id.. The court states that collateral estoppel is not allowable where '"[a] new
determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the
procedures followed in the two [proceedings] or... [t]he party sought to be precluded...
did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the
initial action." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28). The court discussed
two comments contained in Section 28, which state that collateral estoppel should not apply
when one procedure is geared toward prompt, inexpensive determination of rather small
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Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments was
applicable to Rue because of the differences in the possible
economic consequences of the two proceedings and because of the
quick and informal nature of the unemployment compensation
45
hearing.
Accordingly, the court decided that K-Mart had not had a full and
fair opportunity during the unemployment compensation hearing to
litigate the issue of whether Rue had misappropriated the potato
chips.4 The supreme court affirmed the superior court's holding
that the referee's factual finding should not have been used to
collaterally estop K-Mart from litigating the issue of whether Rue
had stolen the potato chips in the defamation action. 47 The case
was remanded to the trial court to determine the issue of
defamation. 48
The first case in which the United States Supreme Court directly
addressed the issue of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, and
differentiated it from the doctrine of res judicata was Cromwell v.
County of Sac.49 Cromwell involved bonds issued by Sac County,
Iowa, to raise money for the construction of a new courthouse. 50
The plaintiff, Cromwell, sued to recover on four bonds issued by
the county and four coupons attached to the bonds. 51 The county
asserted the defense that an earlier action, Smith v. Sac County,52
involving the same bonds at issue in this case, estopped Cromwell
from raising his present claim.5 In addition, the county presented
claims and the other proceeding is much larger, is more detailed, and involves a complex
claim, or a vastly different amount in controversy. Rue, 713 A-2d at 86, (citing RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 28, Comments d, j, and Verbilla v. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Bd., 668 A.2d 601, 605 (Pa. Connw. 1995)).
45. Rue, 713 A.2d at 86.
46. Id.
47. Id. The Court notes that the holding espoused by the court was limited to the
application of collateral estoppel in the context of unemployment compensation only, and
has no bearing on caselaw dealing with the preclusive effect of workers' compensation
proceedings due to the distinct statutes and procedures dealt with in those cases. Id. at 87.
48. Id.
49. 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876).
50. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 358-59.
51. Id. at 351.
52. 78 U.S. 139 (1870).
53. Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876). In Smith, 78 U.S. at 146, Smith
claimed that he was the owner of 25 interest coupons that had been issued by the county for
the erection of the courthouse and that he had paid value for them before they had reached
maturity, therefore, they were valid claims against the county. Id. The county denied all of
the allegations set forth by Smith, especially those dealing with authorization and validation
of the bonds. Id. at 143. The court hearing the case ruled that, as a matter of law, the bonds
and coupons were void and not attributable to the county, so the county had no
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proof that Cromwell had been the actual owner of the coupons at
issue in the action brought by Smith. The county argued that the
Smith action was brought for Cromwell's sole benefit.
In deciding Cromwell, the court explicitly stated the difference
between the doctrines of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
and res judicata, or claim preclusion. Under a theory of res
judicata, a judgment on the merits serves as an absolute bar to
subsequent actions.w This absolute bar applies to the present claim,
every matter offered to sustain or defeat the claim, and both
parties to the present claim as well as those in privity with the
parties.57 Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, operates as a bar
to only those matters in issue or those claims upon which the
verdict or judgment rested on.58 Therefore, in cases involving
collateral estoppel, the question involves the issue that was actually
litigated and decided in the first action and not what might have
59
been litigated and decided.
Applying this rule to Smith, the Supreme Court held that,
because each bond and coupon represented a different claim,
litigation was barred only as to the coupons actually at issue in
that action. 60 Smith's inability to factually show that he paid value
for the coupons has no bearing as to whether Cromwell could
61
factually show that he paid value for his bonds and coupons.
Although the Court was unwilling to apply the doctrine of res
judicata to the bonds in the second case, the Court did apply the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude relitigation of one issue
previously decided in Smith-whether the bonds were legal or
fraudulent. 62 The Court's previous determination that the bonds had
responsibility to pay on the bonds or coupons. Id. The supreme court, on appeal, held that
the evidence showed that the bonds had been fraudulently issued in the first place, which
then put the burden on Smith to show that regardless of the fraudulent state of the bonds
and coupons, he had paid value for them before maturity. Id. at 148. The Court concluded
that Smith was not a holder of coupons for value, so the coupons were void, allowing the
county to escape all liability. Id. at 148-49.
54. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352.
55. Id.
56. Id. Res judicata involves the effect of a judgment as a bar against the prosecution
of a second action on the same claim. Id.
57. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 353. Collateral estoppel involves the effect of a judgment as
an estoppel in a different action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action. Id.
58. Id. at 353.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 359.
61. Id. at 360.
62. Id. at 359.
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been issued fraudulently collaterally estopped Cromwell from
relitigating that issue in his case.
6 The next case to advance the concept of collateral estoppel was
heard more than 60 years after Cromwell. In Bernhard v. Bank of
America,64 the central issue was whether an interbank transfer
could be considered a gift. Bernhard also addressed the issues of
collateral estoppel and res judicata."6 Bernhard eliminates the
requirement of mutuality and clarifies the requirements for the
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.66 The Supreme
Court of California found that there was no compelling reason to
require a party asserting collateral estoppel or res judicata to have
been a party, or in privity with a party to, the earlier litigation and
cited a number of courts that had already abandoned the
requirement of mutuality.67 The court was careful to note, however,
that the requirements of due process forbid the application of res
judicata or collateral estoppel against a party unless he or she is
bound by the earlier litigation.68 By dispensing with the mutuality
requirement, the court permitted Cook to assert res judicata against
9
Bernhard's claim.6
Significantly, Bernhard also clarifies the requirements for the use of
collateral estoppel. 7° The court identified three requirements for
collateral estoppel to apply.7' These requirements are (1) that the
issue decided in the previous adjudication be identical with the one
63. Id.
64. 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942). Clara Sather, an elderly woman in poor health, authorized
Cook to make drafts jointly from her bank account. Id. at 893. Cook's wife opened a second
bank account in Sather's name, without her authority. Id. Funds were then transferred from
the first account to the second account, and eventually Sather signed a paper authorizing her
funds to be transferred to the new account. Id. After Sather died, Cook was name executor,
eventually he resigned as executor, making no mention of he bank account. Id. Beneficiaries
under the will filed objections with the probate court, and the court determined that the
money in the bank account was a gift to Cook from Sather. Id. One of the beneficiaries was
named as administratrix after Cook's resignation, and she filed the instant action, seeking to
recover the money in the bank account under the allegation that Sather had never authorized
its withdrawal. Id.
65. Id. at 894.
66. Id. at 895. Mutuality is the idea that a judgment will not be held conclusive in favor
of one person unless it would be conclusive against him had the case been decided the other
way. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, 1021 (6th ed. 1990).
67. Bernhard, 122 P2d at 894-95. Justice Traynor goes on to say that "just why a party
who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res
judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend." Id. at 895
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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in the action in question, (2) that there be a final judgment on the
merits, and (3) that the party against whom the defense is asserted
was a party or is in privity with a party to the previous
72
adjudication.
The first federal case to allow the full application of collateral
estoppel to administrative findings was United States v. Utah
Construction and Mining Co. 73 In this case, Utah Construction had
a contract dispute with the Atomic Energy Commission;74 Utah
Construction took the dispute to the contract appeals board, as it
was required to do by the terms of the contract, and the appeals
board made factual findings and awarded partial relief to Utah
Construction. 75 Not satisfied with the result, Utah Construction
sued the government for breach of contract in federal district
court.7 6 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the
contract appeals board's findings did have preclusive effect under
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.7 7 The Court held that when an
administrative agency acts in a judicial capacity rather than an
administrative capacity and the opportunity to litigate was
adequate, res judicata or collateral estoppel should apply to
78
findings of fact.
Another Supreme Court case that shaped the modem doctrine of
collateral estoppel was Parklane Hosiery v. Shore.79 At issue in
ParklaneHosiery was whether a party is collaterally estopped from
relitigating the same issues of fact before a jury on the basis of
adverse findings of fact as to those same issue in an equitable
action involving a party not party to the case at bar.80 Two different
actions had been brought against Parklane Hosiery for allegedly
issuing a materially false and misleading proxy statement in
72. Bernhard, 122 P.2d at 895.
73. 384 U.S. 394, (1966).
74. Utah Construction, 384 U.S. at 400.
75. Id. at 401. The contract appeals board denied Utah Construction's request for delay
damages but granted a request for a time extension, both of which resulted from Utah
Construction encountering float rock in the course of their work that increased costs and
time for the project. Id.
76. Id. The court of claims held that it was not bound by the factual determinations of
the Board, conducted a de novo hearing, and held that the government did breach the
contract. Id. at 418-419.
77. Utah Construction,384 U.S. at 421-22. The court stated that the decision rested on
the agreement of the parties as modified by the Wunderlich Act, but that the result reached
was in accord with the general principles of collateral estoppel. Id.
78. Utah Construction, 384 U.S. at 422, citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381, (1940).
79. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
80. ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 324.
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connection with a merger.81 The first action was a stockholder class
action suit for damages, and the second was an action seeking
injunctive relief, brought by the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). 82 The SEC action was decided first, and the
stockholders contended that, on the basis of the findings in that
case, Parklane was collaterally estopped from relitigating whether
the proxy statement was materially false, misleading, and against
the law.83 The United States Supreme Court held that trial courts
should have broad discretion to determine whether "offensive"
collateral estoppel, in which a plaintiff attempts to estop a
defendant from relitigating issues that the defendant had lost in an
action brought by another plaintiff, should be utilized. 84 The Court
created the following general rule to determine whether offensive
collateral estoppel is applicable and necessary, so as to minimize
any possible negative effects its use may create: the trial judge
should not allow offensive collateral estoppel when a plaintiff
easily could have joined in the earlier action or when the
application would be unfair to a defendant, such as when the
defendant did not have the same incentive in the first action to
litigate as he would in the second action.8 Under this rule, the
Parklane Court allowed the use of offensive collateral estoppel to
estop Parklane from relitigating issues that had been decided in the
suit brought by the SEC. 86
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court first identified the requirements
for the application of collateral estoppel in Pennsylvania in
Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams.87 In this case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed whether the doctrine of res
81. Id.
82. Id. Injunctive relief was sought by the SEC for essentially the same reason that the
first action was filed, that the petitioners had issued a false and misleading proxy statement
in violation of SEC regulations. Id.
83. Id. at 325. The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Parklane's
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial would be denied if collateral estoppel was used. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, deciding that as long as Parklane had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the nonjury trial, then collateral estoppel can apply in
a subsequent jury trial to the same issues of fact. Id.
84. Id. at 331. The Supreme Court was concerned that offensive collateral estoppel
creates an incentive for the plaintiff to 'wait and see" what happens in the first action, thus
discouraging judicial economy by combining plaintiffs together in one action against the
defendant. Id. Also, the Court was worried that offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to
the defendant because during the first action the defendant may not have the same incentive
to litigate as he would in the second action. Id. at 330.
85. ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 331.
86. Id. at 332-33.
87. 345 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1975).
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judicata or collateral estoppel could prevent insurance policy
holders from instituting an action when they had been involved in a
previous suit brought by the state insurance department, that arose
out of the same action on the part of the defendant.88 The court set
89
forth four requirements for the application of collateral estoppel:
(1) the issue decided in the first adjudication must be identical to
the one presented in the later action; (2) there must be a final
judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the defense is
asserted must be a party to or in privity with a party to the first
adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the defense is
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in question in the previous action 0 The court held that prong
one, identity of issues, had not been satisfied in this case;
therefore, the doctrine of collateral estoppel would not be applied
to the suit brought by the policyholders. 91 The first action instituted
by the insurance department was based on an alleged violation of
statutory law resulting in irreparable harm to the policyholders.9
The second case was based on alleged violations of individual
policyholders' contractual rights and the irreparable harm that
could occur if their policies were cancelled. 93 The court found that,
on the basis of these facts, the requirement of identity of issues
was not satisfied.9
In Odgers v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 95 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed
the issue of whether preclusive effect should be given to a finding
of the definition of "strike" under the Public Employee Relations
Act, in a later action under the Pennsylvania Unemployment
Compensation Act. The supreme court held collateral estoppel did
not apply against the second determination because the two acts
were enacted to promote different public policies of the state.9
88. Safeguard, 345 A-2d at 664.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 668-69.
93. Safeguard, 345 A.2d at 669.
94. Id. at 668-70.
95. 514 Pa. 378, 385, 525 A.2d 359, 362 (1987).
96. Odgers, 514 Pa. at 387. The Court, in looking at the first act, entitled the Public
Employee Relations Act, concluded that it was created to give public employees the right to
organize and bargain with their employers, so as to create good working relationships that
would ultimately benefit the entire state. Id. The second act, the Unemployment
Compensation Law, was created to alleviate economic hardship in the cases of unemployed
individuals, which has less of a direct impact on the state as a whole. Id.
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Therefo re, the court concluded that the "identity of issues" prong
97
was not satisfied.
One year after Odgers, the Third Circuit undertook a similar
analysis in Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co.98 The Third Circuit
considered whether factual findings made by the unemployment
compensation board of review that an appellant had quit his job
without compelling reasons collaterally estopped that appellant
from bringing a civil claim for wrongful discharge. 99 The circuit
court employed the rationale used in Odgers to determine that,
given the differing public policies of the Unemployment
Compensation Act and the Public Employee Relations Act, there
was no identity of issues justifying collateral estoppel. 1°° The court
reasoned that, under the Public Employee Relations Act, the
existence of racial discrimination in connection with a discharge is
crucial to the litigation; in the first action before the unemployment
compensation board of review, no findings pertaining to racial
discrimination were made. 101 Because an issue central to the
second action was not discussed in the first action, there can be no
102
collateral estoppel.
One year after Kelley, the Pennsylvania Superior Court decided a
case that appeared to contradict Odgers'0 3 and Kelley.'04 In
Frederick v. American Hardware Supply Co., the superior court
considered whether an earlier decision of an unemployment
compensation board of review denying benefits to a group of
employees who were discharged as a result of alleged willful
misconduct collaterally estopped those employees from asserting in
court that, under their contract, they had been wrongfully
97. Id. at 364-65.
98. 860 E2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1988).
99. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1189. TYK Industries, a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese
Company, hired Mr. Kelley, a white male, to be Chief Operating Officer and Executive
Vice-President of the company. Id. Mr. Kelley was later terminated by TYK, and he alleged
that his discharge was due to his race, in violation of employment discrimination laws. Id. at
1190. The next year Mr. Kelley attempted to obtain unemployment compensation, which was
ultimately denied by the unemployment compensation board of review. Id. at 1191. After his
rejection, Kelley filed a claim against TYK, alleging wrongful discharge and violation of his
federal civil rights. Id. During the course of the court proceeding, determinations made by
the unemployment board were used by TYK to collaterally estop certain issues from being
litigated. Id. at 1192.
100. Id. at 1194-95.
101. Id. at 1195-96.
102. Id. at 1196-97.
103. Odgers v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 525 A.2d
359 (Pa. 1987).
104. Kelley, 860 E2d at 1188.
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discharged. 1 5 The court held that the decision rendered by the
unemployment compensation board regarding willful misconduct
did collaterally estop the discharged employees from declaring that
they had been wrongfully discharged. 1° In this case, as in other
cases, the court recognized that, of the four elements required for
the application of collateral estoppel, the requirement of identity of
issues would merit the most scrutiny.107 After examining the
unemployment compensation board's decision that the employees
had been discharged for "willful misconduct," the court opined that
this finding precluded the employees from asserting that they had
been wrongfully discharged. 08 The court decided that the
requirement of "identity of issues" had been satisfied and because
the other three requirements had also been met, applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. °9
One year after the decision rendered in Frederick v. American
Hardware Supply Co., the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
issued a contrary ruling on a similar issue. 10° In PennsylvaniaState
Police v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, the court considered whether a state police trooper who
had been discharged for misconduct was collaterally estopped from
asserting that he had not committed willful misconduct during a
subsequent unemployment compensation hearing."' The court
105. 557 A.2d 779 (Pa. Super. 1989).
106. Frederick, 557 A.2d at 781. Mr. Frederick and other former employees of American
Hardware Supply Co. sued their former employer, alleging that American Hardware had
breached an implied contract of employment when American wrongly discharged them. Id.
The employees claimed that certain provisions of their employee handbook that outlined the
terms and conditions of employment created the implied contract Id.
107. Id. at 76. Other cases in which the court focused its analysis on the requirement
that the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the
later action, include Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1975),
Odgers v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 525 A.2d 359 (Pa.
1987), and Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1988).
108. Frederick, 557 A.2d at 781. Willful misconduct was defined by the court as "an act
of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interests, deliberate violation of the
employer's rules or instruction, and disregard of standards of behavior which an employer
has a right to expect of an employee." Id. (quoting Kilgus v. Commonwealth Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 466 A-2d 1121 (Pa Commw. 1983)). The conduct that led the
board to conclude "willful misconduct" by the employees was deemed to be the equivalent
of good cause for dismissal, thereby disallowing any contention of wrongful discharge.
Frederick, 557 A.2d at 781.
109. Id.
110. Pennsylvania State Police v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 578 A.2d 1360, 1366 (Pa. Commw. 1990).
111. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 A.2d at 1361. The misconduct for which the state
trooper was discharged involved a court martial conducted by the State Police in which the
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,ultimately decided that collateral estoppel could not be applied in
this context, because the requirement of "identity of issues" was
not satisfied.11 2 In this case the court adopted a narrow view as to
what issues are decided in an unemployment compensation
113
hearing.
The court found that in a willful misconduct case it must
determine whether the state is justified, under the Pennsylvania
Unemployment Compensation Law, in denying benefits to an
employee, and should not determine whether the employer was
justified in firing the employee.11 4 Under this analysis, the court
held that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because of lack of
identity of issues." 5
In Swineford v. Snyder County, Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals determined whether a finding by the
unemployment compensation review board that an employee did
not violate the employer's rules or act to detrimentally affect the
employer's business would collaterally estop the employer and
supervisors from rebutting allegations in a subsequent civil action
filed by the employee alleging that the employee had been fired
because of things she said.11 6 Although the court acknowledged that
the issue of whether collateral estoppel applies to determinations
made during unemployment compensation hearings was unsettled,
it ultimately held that the Pennsylvania courts would not apply
collateral estoppel in this situation."' The court used an analysis
trooper was found guilty of "Unbecoming Conduct" as well as "Discrimination or
Harassment," in violation of the State Police Code. Id. at 1360 (citing State Police Court
Martial Board Hearing, 12/15/88, Conclusions of Law, Nos. 2, 3). Both charges stemmed from
allegations made by two female police officers that the trooper had sexually harassed the.
Pennsylvania State Police, 578 A2d at 1362.
112. Id. at 1361.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Frumento v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 351 A.2d 631
(Pa. 1976)).
115. Id. at 1361.
116. Swineford v. Snyder County Pennsylvania, 15 E3d 1258, 1261-62 (3d Cir. 1994). In
this case the plaintiff is appealing a lower court decision in favor of the defendants based on
an action filed by the plaintiff claiming that the defendants, when they fired her for publicly
disclosing alleged electoral improprieties, had violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. Id. at 1261. The relevant issue here was whether collateral estoppel would apply in
the present action based on findings made by an Unemployment Compensation Board. Id. at
1261-62.
117. Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1267, 1269. The court in drawing this conclusion cited to
Frederick v. American Hardware Supply Co., 557 A.2d 779 (Pa. 1989), Kelley v. TYK
Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1988), and Odgers v. Commonwealth Unemployment
CompensationBd. of Review, 525 A.2d 359 (Pa. 1987).
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similar to that used in Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 8 and
determined that the issue of discharge decided by an
unemployment compensation board was not the same as the issue
of discharge presented in a civil rights claim therefore, the requisite
identity of issues is lacking.1 9 In addition, the court looked at the
policies underlying each of the two laws and concluded that
allowing collateral estoppel in these cases would undermine the
purpose of unemployment compensation hearings: to provide fast
relief to those who seek it. 20 These factors resulted in the court's
decision not to apply collateral estoppel in this case. 2 '
In analyzing the various decisions handed down by both the
federal and Pennsylvania courts involving the application of
collateral estoppel from an administrative hearing decision to a
civil action, it is clear that Rue is correct and long overdue. For
years the courts have shifted back and forth in deciding whether
collateral estoppel applied between the two judicial proceedings. It
appears that those decisions allowing the application of collateral
estoppel failed to examine each of the four prongs set out in
Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co. 12 2 Most cases focused on the prong
dealing with identity of issues, which, although important in some
cases, is not the most important in this type of collateral estoppel
situation. In the context of an unemployment compensation
hearing, the prong requiring the party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted to have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in question in a prior action could not be satisfied
without recreating the entire unemployment compensation system.
In Rue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court correctly focused on this
issue and the public policy questions that it raises. This aspect of
118. 860 F.2d at 1194.
119. Swineford, 15 F.3d at 1268.
120. Id. at 1268-69. The Court observed that the Unemployment Compensation Law is a
depression-era statute, that was created to provide fast, efficient compensation to
unemployed workers, and to shift the costs related to unemployment from the state welfare
system to employers. Id. at 1268.
121. Id. at 1269. To sustain their decision, the court noted similar analysis used by
other states in cases involving collateral estoppel in relation to unemployment compensation
hearings. See Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that it
would not be equitable to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel); Shovelin v. Central N.M.
Elec. Coop., 850 P.2d 996, 1004 (N.M. 1993) (affirming the decision of the trial court to refuse
the application of collateral estoppel to findings of the employment security department);
Ferris v. Hawkins, 660 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Ariz. App. 1983) (denying the application of collateral
estoppel because unemployment compensation and court action seeking reinstatement of job
involved 'distinct legal rights').
122. Safeguard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 345 A2d 664 (Pa. 1975).
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collateral estoppel was grossly neglected in Frederick, the leading
Pennsylvania case that applied collateral estoppel to an
unemployment compensation hearing.'13
The public policy behind the unemployment compensation
system restricts litigants, especially employers, from litigating their
case to the fullest extent possible. The unemployment
compensation system is a high volume system created to churn out
as many decisions as feasible in a limited time. The motivation to
do this is created by the'premise of the system, which is to provide
benefits to those who need them. 124 A .referee rather than a judge
conducts the first unemployment hearing and there is no
requirement that either side be represented by counsel. The
unemployment compensation procedure may at best be labeled
25
quasi-judicial. 1
Although the unemploment compensation- heraing procedure is
sufficient for the purpose it serves, it simply does not satisfy the
requirements for the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The expedient
nature of the process, and the minimal consequences that it
produces for the employer encourages employers not to litigate to
their utmost ability. The supreme court focused on these public
policy issues in the instant case. To allow a decision made in the
unemployment compensation context to have preclusive effect in a
civil action that could involve millions of dollars would distort the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and undermine the long struggle in
the courts for a precise definition of collateral estoppel.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Rue was correct;
however, the tendency of the courts in the past to vacillate in their
decisions should prompt the state legislature to take action. The
unemployment compensation system is a state-created entity, so it
would be natural for the state legislature to pass legislation
mandating that decisions rendered by the unemployment
compensation board have no preclusive effect in any subsequent
123. In Frederick v. American Hardware Supply Co., 557 A.2d 779 (Pa. 1989), the sole
reference made to the fourth prong of the test for the application of collateral estoppel was
the parties in the unemployment compensation proceedings had the opportunity "to litigate
on the merits." Frederick, 557 A-2d 779, 780 (Pa. Super. 1989).
124. See Odgers v. Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 525 A.2d
359, 364 (Pa. 1987).
125. Quasi judicial is defined as: a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a
basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1245 (6th ed. 1990).
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civil action. Such legislation is the only way the issue will be
ultimately settled. Because the courts have not been able to draw a
steadfast decision on the issue during the past twenty years,
especially when specific guidelines in the form of the four prongs
exist to guide the courts in their analysis, one cannot be sure that
Rue will stand.
Jennifer R. Minter

